How Important Is Informed Trading for the Bid-Ask Spread? Evidence from an Emerging Market by Jan Hanousek & Richard Podpiera
1
How Important Is Informed Trading for the Bid-Ask Spread?
Evidence from an Emerging Market




The link between informed trading and the bid-ask spread has been the focus of abundant literature and
some authors feared that a large amount of informed trading might lead to shutdown of markets. We
explore this issue using data from the Czech Republic. Our estimates confirm that the share of informed
trading and its variability is indeed high relative to developed markets, however, share of the adverse
selection component is only 14% of the spread. Since the Czech Republic has been known in the financial
community as being plagued by informed trading, our findings suggest that the relative importance of
adverse selection as a determinant of the spread is generally low across markets.
Abstrakt
9 WRPWR ￿OiQNX RGKDGXMHPH UR]VDK REFKRGRYiQt QD ]iNODG￿ QHYH￿HMQŒFK LQIRUPDFt Y ￿HVNp UHSXEOLFH￿
5R]VDK WDNRYpKR REFKRGRYiQt MH G$OH￿LWŒ QHER" SRGOH Y￿WªLQ\ QRY￿MªtFK PRGHO$ FKRYiQt LQYHVWRU$ XU￿XMH
OLNYLGLWX WUKX L QiNODG\ MHKR ~￿DVWQtN$ D WtP WDNp HIHNWLYQRVW MHKR IXQJRYiQt￿ 1DªH RGKDG\ XND]XMt￿ ￿H
SUDYG￿SRGREQRVW￿ ￿H GDQŒ REFKRG MH PRWLYRYiQ ]QDORVWt QHYH￿HMQŒFK LQIRUPDFt GRVDKXMH X DNFLt Y V\VWpPX
63$’ KRGQRW\ ￿￿￿￿ FR￿ MH WpP￿￿ GYDNUiW YtFH YH VURYQiQt L V PpQ￿ OLNYLGQtPL DNFLHPL QD 1<6(￿ 1DYtF
WDNp YDULDELOLWD WRNX REFKRGQtFK S￿tND]$ MH Y ￿HVNp UHSXEOLFH Y\ªªt￿ FR￿ GiOH ]Y\ªXMH UL]LNR QHVHQp WY$UFL
WUKX D ]￿HMP￿ L SR￿DGRYDQRX NRPSHQ]DFL ]D MHMLFK VOX￿E\ – Y\ªªt WUDQVDN￿Qt QiNODG\ SDN VQL￿XMt DWUDNWLYLWX
￿HVNpKR WUKX￿
Keywords: market microstructure, informed trading, bid-ask spread, adverse selection
JEL Classification: G14, G15
                                                     
1 Both authors are at CERGE-EI, a joint workplace of Charles University and the Academy of Sciences of
the Czech Republic, Prague. Jan Hanousek currently fills the Citibank Chair in Financial Markets at
CERGE-EI. This research was supported by the National Science Foundation of the United States (grant
number SPR-9712336) and by the PHARE/ACE Research Program of the European Union (grant number
P97-8118-R). We would like to thank Randall K. Filer and Jan Kmenta for their suggestions and
comments. Correspondence to: Richard Podpiera, CERGE-EI, P.O. Box 882, Politických Y￿]￿$ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
Prague, Czech Republic. E-mail: Richard.Podpiera@cerge.cuni.cz.2
1.  Introduction
The link between informed trading (adverse selection of traders) and the bid-ask spread
has been the focus of plentiful research since the bid-ask spread is an important
determinant of trading costs.
2  Some authors have suggested that if informed trading is
common, it might lead to market shutdown as the spread would be simply too wide for
investors to participate in trading.
Historically, the bid-ask spread has been regarded as a function of order processing and
inventory costs. More recent research brought adverse selection and thus informed
trading into the picture. In this view, the market maker (as a provider of liquidity who
always quotes prices for buying and selling) faces the possibility of trading with agents
who have superior information. The market maker will lose money when trading with
such individuals, and he or she thus sets a spread between the bid and ask price in order
to compensate for this adverse selection problem. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) were the
first to show formally that, with informed trading, a bid-ask spread would exist even if
there were no order processing and inventory costs. The current literature thus
distinguishes three components of the bid-ask spread, that is, inventory, order processing
and adverse selection components.
Despite the fact that a number of empirical studies attempted to estimate the components
of the bid-ask spread, the problem of the size of the adverse selection component does not
have a final solution. Earlier studies suggested that the share of the adverse selection
component is large. For instance, Stoll (1989), who used a sample of NASDAQ stocks,3
reported that 43% of the quoted spread is due to adverse selection. On the other hand,
George, Kaul and Nimalendran (1991) estimate much smaller share of adverse selection
costs. For a sample of NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks, they put this share in the
range of 8–13%. Huang and Stoll (1997) estimate a general model and offer two ways of
decomposing the spread. They thus also estimate two values of this share–9.6% and
21.5%. It is difficult to explain the differences of the estimated shares due to adverse
selection since the cited studies differ both in terms of the data and the estimation
methodology they use. Generally, recent studies suggest that the share of the adverse
selection component is rather low–at least for developed markets. This induces the
question to what extent is the adverse selection component important across markets,
especially those plagued by informed trading. The current paper addresses precisely this
issue.
The current paper investigates the bid-ask spread components on the Czech stock market,
with a focus on the adverse selection component. Besides the fact that it provides
evidence for the composition of the bid-ask spread from an emerging market and high
frequency data (previous studies dealt almost exclusively with U.S. markets and, except
for the most recent studies, had only daily and weekly data), we believe our analysis is
interesting from two additional points of view. First, when estimating the adverse
selection component, we combine the recent findings of the inventory literature with
older methods of estimation. In previous literature, the structure of the market–mainly the
distinction between competitive market makers and a single specialist–was to a large
extent ignored, possibly due to the fact that less detailed data were used.
                                                                                                                                                             
2 “Bid-ask spread” is defined as the difference between the price at which the market maker is willing to4
Second, the present paper offers an insight into the magnitude of the adverse selection
component not only in an emerging market, but in a market which has been known to the
international investment community as one being seriously plagued by insider trading.
The development of the Czech equity market was very rapid at the outset, since a large
number of companies were floated as a result of coupon privatization. The regulation of
the market, however, lagged significantly behind. Insider trading, price manipulation,
fraud in the investment funds industry, and abuses of minority shareholder rights eroded
investor confidence to a large extent. In recent years, regulation has improved somewhat,
but enforcement appears to still be rather weak.
3 Especially in terms of the quality and
timeliness of information disclosure, the Czech market still offers a lot of space for
informed, and more often than not insider, trading.
Should the adverse selection component be small on this market, then it is safe to assume
that its practical importance is also low on most other markets. In this sense, we estimate
an upper bound of the importance of the adverse selection component.
Besides being known as an insider market, there is another reason why the Czech equity
market offers a good opportunity for this kind of inquiry. The setup of its key component,
the SPAD trading system, which is based on market makers that quote prices in selected
                                                                                                                                                             
sell and the price at which he is willing to buy.
3 The reflection of the Czech equity market in the eyes of the international investor community can be
illustrated by articles in the press and the evaluation by international organizations. The Economist (April
1996) and the Wall Street Journal (May 1996), among others, reported on “dealing in Prague as a losers'
guide to investment,” and characterized the Czech capital market as “a muddy market” and  as “anarchy to
the outsider, sweet profit to those in the know”. More recently, The Economist (March 1997) quoted an
investor as saying “…[the government should] fight the perception that the Prague stock exchange is just a
vehicle for select insiders to enrich themselves at the expense of the ordinary shareholder”. In its 1999
Country Study, the World Bank argues that “The capital market needs to be further strengthened to recover
credibility and to be a real source of corporate financing“ (Summary Report, page 17). It is also illustrative
that the Prague Stock Exchange has been unable to become a member of the Federation of European Stock5
stocks, is very suitable for investigating the components of the bid-ask spread and
inquiring into the effect of informed trading. It corresponds to the basic setup of many
theoretical models, for instance, the trading lots are rather large, so in most trades only
one lot changes hands, which allows us to abstract from the trade size. Also, there are
several market makers for each stock that compete for order flow. Only the most liquid
Czech stocks are included in the system, but these are nevertheless only medium-sized in
international terms.
4
There was one earlier attempt to estimate the extent of insider trading at the Prague Stock
Exchange. N (1998) attempted to estimate an Easley et al. (1996b)-type model,
but at that time the SPAD system was only at the beginning of its operation thus detailed
data were not available. N concluded that the insider trading or adverse selection
component of the bid-ask spread was relatively insignificant. However, due to
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individual trades were available), his conclusions were not very robust. Moreover, at that
time, the liquidity at the PSE’s automated price-setting system was minuscule since a
majority of trades were conducted outside of the exchange and it was actually
advantageous for informed investors to trade off the exchange. In this paper, we use
completely different data, from a new trading system, and from a time period when the
vast majority of the order flow is publicly observable.
                                                                                                                                                             
Exchanges, even though both Budapest and Warsaw Stock Exchanges are associate members of this
federation.
4 We thus do not face the problem that our sample would be formed by large companies which tend to have
a lower spread in absolute terms and, as shown by Easley et al. (1996b), also tend to have lower adverse
selection component of the spread. For a more detailed discussion of the sample selection and comparison
with developed markets, see the next section (Trading System and Data Description).6
In the next section, we describe the trading system and the data. In Section 3, then, we
estimate the extent of informed trading by using the approach of Easley et al. (1996b), in
order to ascertain whether informed trading indeed plays an important role in the Czech
market. In the following section, we describe the models we use to investigate the
components of the spread. At first, we examine the basic characteristics of market maker
behavior based on findings of inventory models. Then, we present our strategy for
estimating the adverse selection component of the spread and review the Huang and Stoll
(1997) approach, which we later use for comparative purposes. Section 5 depicts the
estimation results. Section 6 summarizes our findings and concludes.
2.  Trading System and Data Description
2.1. Trading System
The SPAD segment of the Prague Stock Exchange is formed by market makers who are
obliged to quote prices for sale and purchase. The whole system is screen-based with all
the market makers, and, in fact, all the members of the PSE, able to see all the quotes and
trades. Members of the PSE who apply and are approved serve as market makers in the
SPAD system. This system was launched in May 1998 with the aim of improving the
liquidity in the market. It was successful in attracting order flow from the OTC market
and, currently, the vast majority of trades in the securities that are listed in SPAD, are
channeled through this system.7
The most liquid Czech stocks are traded in the system. The number of stocks in SPAD
grew from a single stock at the outset to the current number of eight stocks. There are two
telecommunications companies (telecom 		two banks
 
 	  banka), a petrochemical company (Unipetrol), an
electricity 
 !an investment fund (RIF) and a construction company (IPS).
5
Daily trading volume in SPAD amounted to approximately 500 million CZK (some 17
million USD) for most of its existence and only at the beginning of 2000 grew sharply to
almost 2 billion (bn) CZK (50 million USD). In the period under study (late 1999) daily
trading volume hovered around the (mn) 500 million CZK level.
6
In late 1999 there were 16 market makers who quoted at least one stock in the system. On
average, each market maker quoted approximately 6 stocks. Viewed differently, each of
the eight stocks had some 12 market makers who were quoting it. The SPAD rules
stipulate that there must be at least 3 market makers for each stock for it to be traded in
the system. In reality, the number of market makers for each stock is considerably higher
than the required minimum.
7
Individual market makers are allowed to quote different ask and bid prices, but the
maximum spread for each of them is limited. A committee of the PSE sets the exact
limits, but we can say that it corresponds roughly to 2.5% of the stock’s price (depending
                                                     
5 One more bank, IPB, had its stock traded in the SPAD system. In June 2000, however, IPB was put under
forced administration and its stock was suspended from trading. Because it was introduced into SPAD only
in November 1999 and thus was not traded in the system during the time period we focus on, we leave it
out altogether.
6 At the same time, the share of the SPAD system of the whole PSE trading volume was rather high in
1999, at 82%, as it was successful in attracting order flow from the direct trades segment.
7 Earlier, there was an informal limit on the maximum number of marker makers for one stock (10). It was
abolished before the time period under study began.8
on the development of the stock’s price the maximum spread is irregularly changed). The
system operates in two phases, closed and open. The closed phase can be viewed as a
technical device that allows market makers to clear the trades that they did not manage to
conduct during the open phase and is not important for our purposes. The actual trading
occurs during the open phase of the system, which lasts from 9.30 a.m. to 4.00 p.m. each
trading day and during which the market makers quote firm prices for a fixed amount of
shares of each stock. The size of trading lots varies from 1,000 shares for 
radiokomunikace to 20,000 shares for "     
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occasionally changed, depending on price development of the stock. The trading lots are
rather large, both as compared with the overall trading volume and with the capital base
of some of the market makers.
8 The quotes are firm in the sense that if the quote is the
best available on the market and if a counterparty reacts to it in the system by entering an
instruction for a trade, the market maker is obliged to enter his instruction so that the
trade can be executed. Blocks of shares that differ in size from the trading lot can be
settled through the system as well, but these trades are negotiated in advance over the
phone and, in fact, are not very frequent.
In order to limit the risk of default, there exists a standard settlement procedure and a
guarantee fund, into which market makers must insert a deposit, and there are procedures
that come in place if one side of the trade defaulted. Overall, trading in SPAD appears to
be safe, since no serious problems of default were reported since its inception.
                                                     
8 The market value of one trading lot ranged from 0.7 mn CZK to 5.3 mn CZK in late 1999 and averaged
slightly below 2.0 mn CZK.9
2.2. Data Description
Data on individual trades from SPAD are publicly available from early 1999 to July
2000. However, we were able to obtain more detailed data for two months, September
and October 1999, and thus concentrate on this time period. We add data from other
months as necessary for estimating some of the models we use below.
For the time period from early 1999 to July 2000, we have the basic data on each trade
conducted in the SPAD system. For each trade, our database carries an identification of
the stock, transaction price, number of shares, time when the trade was concluded, and
the best bid and ask quotes at the time the transaction took place. Also, we are able to
identify so called cross trades, that is, we are able to distinguish trades that are conducted
between the inventory of a market maker and the market maker’s  clients, since these
must be reported in the system as well. For the September and October 1999 we also
observe the identity of the buyer and the seller and an indication of whether there was an
obligation to react on the instruction.
Table 1 depicts the basic characteristics of the stocks in our sample–we investigate all
eight stocks that have been traded in the system. Even though they can be generally
described as the most liquid equities on the Czech market, there are substantial
differences among them. Their market capitalization ranges between a mere 2 bn CZK
for IPS to 124 bn CZK for SPT Telecom. This difference in size is also reflected in
trading activity. We thus see only three trades per day for IPS, on average, and 43 daily
trades for SPT Telecom. These two stocks are indeed extremes, the other stocks are
concentrated in the range of 10–51 bn CZK of market capitalization and, with the
exception of RIF, exhibit decent trading activity.10




























￿(6.¨ 632￿,7(/1$ 11,873 183 33 15 10,000 4.1 2.2% 11
￿￿ 5$’,2.2081,.$&( 36,996 1 203 39 26 1,000 16.8 1.4% 13
￿(= 51,258 87 77 34 20,000 0.9 1.0% 15
IPS 1,831 132 4 3 5,000 3.8 2.9% 11
.20(5￿1¸ %$1.$ 16,865 887 79 25 3,000 11.9 1.3% 12
RIF 12,557 1 309 9 5 1,000 11.5 0.9% 10
SPT TELECOM 124,394 529 243 43 10,000 5.2 1.0% 14
UNIPETROL 10,573 58 50 19 20,000 1.2 2.1% 13
Average 33,293 210 67 170 n.a. 6.7 1.6% 12.4
Source: Prague Stock Exchange and authors’ calculation. The average exchange rate during the two
months amounted to 34.4 CZK/USD.
Note: There were 42 trading days in September and October 1999. Thus, the total number of trades in
these two months ranges between 122 for IPS and 1,823 for SPT Telecom.
*This is the posted spread, that is, the difference between best bid and best ask prices.
As already mentioned above, the total daily turnover slightly exceeded 500 mn CZK in
September and October 1999 and the size of trading lots varied considerably in terms of
the number of shares and somewhat less in terms of the market value of trading lots. The
average spread varied considerably in CZK terms, but its relative value, in percent of
average price, is more important. Here, the variation is smaller, and, again with the
exception of RIF, the percentage spread to a large extent depends on the trading activity.
It is largest for IPS, at 2.9% and lowest for SPT Telecom, at 1%. For the other stocks, the
relation between the percentage spread and the trading activity is rather monotonic.
A comparison of the stocks in our sample with those used in previous studies of informed
trading and the components of the bid-ask spread appears to be in order. Naturally, the
volumes and market capitalization of SPAD stocks is dramatically smaller than those of11
the most liquid U.S. stocks. The average trading volume of the stocks in our sample
approximately equals the average trading volume of the fifth decile (thus approximately
average) stocks from the NYSE included in Easley et al. (1996b). Huang and Stoll (1997)
examined 1992 data for the 20 stocks in the Major Market Index. For these stocks, the
mean percentage posted spread has been hovering between 20 and 70 basis points. The
NASDAQ stocks used by Stoll (1989) are comparable in terms of both volume and
posted percentage spread, and even the reported average number of market makers–13 to
14–corresponds to the number of market makers in SPAD.
Overall, our stocks are less frequently traded and have larger posted spreads than the blue
chips from the U.S.; the differences, however, are not so dramatic to prevent us from
comparing our results with those of previous studies. In fact, the opposite is true, since
our stocks are comparable to an average U.S. stock. If anything, the differences suggest
that the adverse selection component should be larger in the Czech equity market, since
lower trading volume was shown by Easley et al. (1996b) to be associated with a larger
probability of informed trading.12
3.  Estimating the Extent of Informed Trading
3.1. Model and Estimation Method
In order to be able to compare our results to those from developed markets, we use the
model developed by Easley et al. (1996b), who, as a by-product of their effort to relate
differences in information-based trading and the variation in bid-ask spread, estimated the
extent of informed trading for the first, fifth, and eighth deciles of NYSE stocks ranked
by trading volume.
The basic setup of their model is as follows.
9 Potentially informed and uninformed
traders trade a risky asset with a competitive risk neutral market maker. Time is split into
separate trading days and is continuous within each trading day. Before each trading day

















asset has a higher value when good news is coming to the market and a lower value for
bad news. The news is fully realized by the traders by the end of each day–in this sense,
the days are separated.
Both uninformed (did not see any signal) and informed (saw some signal) traders arrive










                                                     
9 The description here is very brief due to space constraints. Please check the original Easley et al. (1996b)
paper for details.13
sellers, who arrive in the case of bad news, and informed buyers, who are attracted by
good news.
Figure 1: Trading Process
Information event
occurs  .
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The market maker knows the initial probabilities attached to each branch of the tree and
updates his beliefs in a Bayesian manner based on the observed order flow. For instance,
a sell order might come from both an informed and an uninformed trader, but its
appearance changes the belief of the market maker about bad news.
Thus, there are three possible events–no news, good news and bad news. The arrival rates
of traders are represented by the number of buy and sell transactions that occur during the
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The first term of the likelihood denotes the “no event” day, the second the “bad event”
day and the last the “good event day”. The likelihood contributions of these day-types
take this form due to the assumption of (independent) Poisson processes driving the
arrival of traders. What makes the difference between the three expressions are the arrival
rates of buyers and sellers–that is what we observe, but we cannot say whether some of
the traders saw a signal or not. In fact, only the order flow, that is, the number of buys
and sells, is used to make an inference about the extent of informed trading in this model.
Since days are independent, the likelihood of observing a series of buys and sells is the
product of the likelihoods for individual days:
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though we do not observe the order flow directly, we can infer from the transaction data
which trades were buyer-initiated and which were seller-initiated. We use the simple rule
that trades occurring above the quote midpoint, that is, above the average of best bid and
ask quotes, are considered to be buys and those below the midpoint are coded as sells.
Since the parameters of the model describe the arrival rates of informed and uninformed
traders and the probability that an information event will occur, their estimates can be15
used to assess the probability that a transaction will be information-based. The








This expression can be intuitively described as a comparison of the expected arrival of
informed traders and the expected arrival of all traders. Thus, the higher the probability
that information event will occur and the larger the arrival rate of the informed traders
relative to the arrival rate of the uninformed, the higher the probability that a trade is
motivated by knowledge of information that is not known to all market participants.
3.2. Estimation Results
We have estimated the model described in Section 3.1 by maximizing the likelihood (2).
We have used the ML procedure in TSP 4.4 package. Since the model uses only the
number of sells and buys every day to estimate the parameters, we would have a
relatively low number of observations if we used only September and October 1999 data.
We have thus extended the sample by one month on each side, that is, we have estimated
the model on data from the beginning of August 1999 utill the end of November 1999.
The number of observations stood at 85 (with minor differences among the individual
stocks due to several missing data points). The estimates are depicted in Table 2.16
Table 2: Estimates of the Extent of Informed Trading (Aug. through Nov. 1999)









































































Average 0.69 0.47 10.2 17.3 0.370 2.5






















with less intensive analyst coverage of the less frequently traded stocks.











should be equally likely overall. There is some variation in these estimates among
individual stocks, but with the exception of RIF, all are reasonably close to 0.5.
                                                     
10 In a relatively illiquid environment, it might be that information events are also of a technical short term
nature, for instance the information that there is a large London buyer. That could help explain the high
HVWLPDWHV RI .￿17
The resulting probability of informed trading, denoted as Prob(inf) and computed




estimates being clustered just below 0.40.
11 On average, it stood at 0.37 and was thus
considerably higher than the probability of informed trading on NYSE as estimated by
Easley et al. (1996b), who estimated this probability to vary from 0.16 for the most liquid
(first decile) stocks to 0.22 for the eighth decile stocks. It is worth noting that the
probability of informed trading for Czech stocks is higher not only as compared to results
for the fifth decile at NYSE (0.21), which is comparable also in terms of trading volume,
but also as compared to the eighth decile (the lowest volume Easley et al. (1996b) used in
estimation). In fact, it is virtually double. It should be noted that the average trading
volume of the stocks in our sample is considerably higher that that of the eighth decile
stocks used by Easley et al.
It appears that informed trading is considerably more important in the Czech Republic
than at NYSE, even if we take into account the differences in trading volume. Moreover,
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case of Czech stocks, while it varied from 0.7 to 1.6 in the Easley et al. study. This is a
feature that increases rather than decreases the variability of order flow. If the market
maker was not risk neutral (as in the Easley et al. (1996b) model), this would increase the
demanded compensation for market making services (and thus also the adverse selection
component of the bid-ask spread).
                                                     
11 Except for the two least liquid stocks (IPS and RIF) all the estimates of informed trading probability are
very close to 0.39.18
A quick comparison of our results with the previous study that dealt with the extent of
informed trading on the Czech market is in order. N (1998) modified the Easley at
al. (1996b) model to use data from the auction mechanism (at the time he wrote his study,
there was no system of market makers). He found, using data from the beginning of the
trading of each stock utill late 1996, that the probability of informed trading varied
between a negligible 0.002 and very small 0.02. We see two problems that make his
estimates weak. First, it is very difficult to estimate the probability of informed trading
from auction results (there are problems with identification of the model). A second, and
more fundamental, problem is that at that time only a very low fraction of trades were
channeled through the auction system. The actual order flow (and therefore the
information it contains) was simply not observable in the auction data. Overall, we
conclude that informed trading played an important role on the Czech market in the
second half of 1999.
4.  Estimating the Size of Adverse Selection Component–Models and Estimation
Method
Several different approaches to estimation of the components of the bid-ask spread exist.
In our view, the approach pioneered by Roll (1984) and developed by others, namely
Stoll (1989) and George et al. (1991) is not suitable in our emerging market setting. This
approach, in essence, uses the covariance of transaction prices or quotes to infer the
effective spread and its components. In order to do that, market efficiency must be
assumed, so that the only source of serial covariance of prices and quotes is the bid-ask19
friction and the factors behind it, like adverse selection. This assumption might be
warranted in the case of developed markets, but we view it as hardly justifiable in an
emerging market setting. We thus prefer another class of models–those that use the trade
indicator to analyze the bid-ask spread.
12
4.1. The Adverse Selection Component of the Bid-Ask Spread–Our Model
We have already mentioned that the basic aim of this paper is to decompose the bid-ask
spread into three components. The first is called the order processing component and is
caused simply by the costs market makers incur when providing market making services–
these costs include various items starting with renting office space and ending with the
salaries of traders. This component does not change with short-term fluctuations of the
order flow and is assumed to be constant. This appears to be a safe assumption as our
sample period includes only a couple of months. The second, inventory component, is
caused by the fact that market makers are exposed to the risk of taking undesired
inventory when quoting firm prices. Order flow, which changes the market maker’s
inventory position, results in quote and price revisions, since the market maker, by
changing the quotes, increases the probability of reversal in his inventory position. The
third adverse selection component of the spread is induced by the fact that the market
maker faces the risk of trading with an agent who has private information about the value
of the asset. The market makers will inevitably lose when trading with such informed
                                                     
12 The trade indicator is usually defined as equal to 1 if the trade is considered to be a buy, -1 for a sell and
0 if the type of the trade is unclear–for instance if the trade was executed exactly at the midpoint between
bid and ask quotes. Some studies do not use 0 and classify all the trades as buys or sells by using additional
characteristics of the order flow, for instance the direction of previous trades.20
agents and they must set a spread between their bid and ask quotes that compensates for
this expected loss. We should also point out that there is a difference between the posted
(quoted) spread, which is simply the difference between the bid and ask quotes, and the
traded (effective) spread. The traded spread takes into account the fact that some trades
are conducted within the inside quote, that is, at better prices than best bid or best ask.
13
As mentioned above, we do not consider the approach started by Roll (1984) and which
uses the covariance of prices or quotes as suitable for our emerging market setting. This
is due to the fact that it hinges critically on the assumption of market efficiency and
makes rather restrictive assumptions in regard to the probabilities of reversal (that is, the
probability that a buy will be followed by a sell and vice versa). We start from the general
model developed in Huang and Stoll (1997), which uses the trade indicator variable and
which, if restricted in an appropriate way, can encompass most of the previous models,
including the original Roll (1984) one. It should be noted that many papers before Huang
and Stoll (1997) ignored one of the components of the spread.
The most serious problem of estimating all the three components of the bid-ask spread
appears to be the distinction between the adverse selection and inventory components.
They both lead to the same revision after a trade–an incoming buy order lowers the
market maker’s inventory so he increases the quotes in order to raise the probability of a
sell order which would balance his inventory position. Similarly, a buy order in an
environment with nonzero probability of informed trading increases the market maker’s
beliefs about the value of the asset and leads to an upward revision of quotes. Thus, buy
orders lead to quote increases and sell quotes to quote decreases due to both adverse
                                                     
13 The inside quote is formed by the best bid and best ask quotes.21
selection and inventory effects and it is difficult to distinguish these two effects
empirically.
Our point is, however, that this truly holds only if there is just one market maker or dealer
(perhaps threatened by an entry so that he or she quotes competitively) like the specialist
at NYSE. In the case of a competitive dealer system (for instance NASDAQ, SEAQ in
London, or our SPAD), market reaction due to inventory reasons will be different, a point
which was not recognized in earlier papers. For instance, Stoll (1989) argues that
NASDAQ can be treated as a one-dealer market. Stoll argues, “Competition among
dealers, the desire of investors to trade with the dealer at the ‘inside’, knowledge by all
dealers of quotes of other dealers, and the knowledge of transaction prices causes the
inside quote [best bid and best offer] and transaction prices to behave as if there were one
dealer”. [Stoll (1989) p. 123]. We disagree. Quote revisions behave differently when
there are multiple dealers as compared to the case of only one specialist. Not only is the
same inventory risk spread among a larger number of market makers and thus also across
a broader capital base, which itself would make the inventory-induced reaction weaker,
but also the behavior of dealers lowers the reaction to inventory.
14 First, dealers with
extreme inventory positions tend to form the inside quote since they want their inventory
positions to be reversed. Second, even if they had the best quotes and took an undesired
inventory, they would revise the quote and thus cease to have the best quotes, but the
second best quote (which is supposedly rather close in a competitive market and in the
case when the inventory position of the first best quote is not so extreme that he would
mind changes in his inventory) would not be affected by the change of inventory, but the22
quote would change only due to the information content of the trade, assuming all market
makers observe all trades.
Thus, even if the market makers who have the best quotes did not like the inventory
change, only the affected market makers would revise their quotes due to inventory
reasons. All other dealers would revise quotes only due to adverse selection, in other
words, only due to a change in the expected fair value of the stock. They do not obtain
any undesired inventory position. An argument might be made that the others would
revise quotes just because they expect the dealer who obtained his undesired inventory
position to try to get rid of it. This, however, is not a valid argument, since it would not
be rational for them to revise their quotes differently than in line with the new expected
fundamental price; why not let him unwind the position. Of course, if one knows there is
a seller, one might be tempted to lower the price further and pick up the stock more
cheaply. However, competition among market makers should prevent this.
The view that dealers set quotes according to their relative inventory positions has been
present in the literature, though it has not been used in the estimation of the bid-ask
spread components. The first paper that dealt with the issue of quote setting by
competitive market makers was Ho and Stoll (1983). This model implies that inventory
position will affect the placement of competing quotes, with the market makers that are at
the inside quote having extreme inventory positions.
15 Lack of detailed data made
empirical testing of this prediction impossible for almost 15 years. Only recently, two
                                                                                                                                                             
14 The risk-sharing feature of multiple dealer systems is also recognized in Affleck-Graves et al. (1994). We
assume that dealers do not view the undesired inventory of other dealers as their own.
15 In fact, Ho and Stoll (1983) solve the model explicitly only for two dealers. Also, the best quotes are not
the reservation prices of the dealers with the extreme positions, but equal to the second best positions (or
only marginally better). This does not affect our analysis here, though.23
papers, Reiss and Werner (1998) and Hansch et al. (1998) tested the crucial predictions of
this and other inventory models explicitly. These two papers use detailed data from the
London Stock Exchange, which has been working as a multiple dealer market, to test the
hypothesis that the positioning of quotes by one market maker relative to that of other
market makers is a function of their inventories. Hansch et al. (1998) found that changes
in quotes and inventories are strongly correlated and that standardized and relative
inventories are mean reverting. They also report that market makers posting competitive
quotes execute a significantly larger proportion of public trades (the data they use offer
the distinction between interdealer and public trades) so competitive quoting indeed
attracts more trade flow. This supports the view that the dealers with the best quotes are
those with extreme inventory positions. Further evidence in Hansch et al. (1998) and the
paper by Reiss and Werner (1998) suggest that dealers engage in interdealer trading
primarily when their inventory position becomes extreme. This lends support to the basic
view that a dealer with an undesired inventory position has two options: either to make
his quotes the best on the market and wait for a client order (which is more profitable, but
uncertain) or to accept a worse price, but unwind the position quickly in an interdealer
trade. When the undesired position becomes large, it is too risky to wait for a public
order.
In fact, this weak inventory-induced response of the competitive dealer system might
explain the results of Stoll (1989), who used NASDAQ data and found only a small
inventory component (10% of the spread). This finding was also one of the arguments
George et al. (1991) use to defend their assumption that the inventory component of the
spread does not exist–however, they use this assumption also for NYSE stocks. This24
would be inappropriate if indeed (as we argue) the competitive dealer system response to
inventory pressure is different from that of a specialist system.
In view of the above discussion on inventories, our approach to the inventory component
of the spread is the following. We assume that under normal circumstances (what is
normal is yet to be defined) the revision of quotes due to inventory reasons in a response
to a trade is negligible since those who have the best quotes actually want the inventory
and there is no reason to expect pressure from interdealer trading. If, however, the
circumstances are not normal and there is thus substantial selling or buying pressure,
several dealers accumulate undesired inventory and use interdealer trades to unwind the
positions. Then, inventory reasons for quote revision might become important also for
those who are not directly affected by the current trade (even though in a world with no
frictions this should not happen). We thus create a binary variable (denoted as PRESS),
which indicates whether a particular trade happened in a period of selling or buying
pressure. We take a moving window of 10 trades prior to the particular trade and, given
the number of sells and buys, determine whether there was trading pressure. We have
chosen three different levels for this variable–we require the cumulative variable to
exceed 4, 6 and 8 sells or buys, which selects almost 50%, 20–30%, and approximately
10% of all trades, respectively, as being conducted under selling or buying pressure.
16 It
should be noted that these frequencies do not fully correspond to the frequencies we
would expect if the trades came from an independent binomial distribution with equal
                                                     
16 This method is similar to the second approach of Huang and Stoll (1997) to the three way decomposition
of the spread, which is based on portfolio trading pressure. They use an aggregate (cumulative) sell-buy
indicator. Their approach is used for NYSE stocks, however, and is thus questionable, since it is difficult to
argue that the specialist should react to inventory changes only when there is overall selling and buying
pressure. Also, the selection of stocks that should be indicative of trading pressure is questionable and
Huang and Stoll do not support this approach very strongly.25
probability of buy and sell, which would be 51%, 9%, and only 0.2%, respectively. This
is caused by the fact that our “draws” are not independent and, if there is indeed
something like trading pressure, we would expect trades in a similar direction to be
clustered (which is indeed the case since the frequencies in our data are higher than the
theoretical frequencies).
Further, we assume that the traded spread is constant, which we believe is a reasonable
assumption given that the time period under study is only two months. Therefore,
Pt – Mt = S/2*Qt + t, (4)
where S is the constant traded spread, Pt is the transaction price at time t, Mt is the quote
midpoint (average between best bid and ask quotes at the time of trade) at time t, and Qt
is the trade indicator variable, which equals 1 if the trade is a buy, -1 if it is a sell, and 0 if
it occurs exactly at the midpoint. We assume that the error term  has zero mean
conditional on Q.
The key part of the model we estimate is based on the model of Huang and Stoll (1997).
In order to save notation (below we estimate the actual Huang and Stoll (1997) model for
comparison) we use the same notation as in their paper. First, the unobservable
fundamental value of the security at time t, Vt,, is driven by the new information in the
most recent trade (from time t-1) as indicated by the trade indicator variable Qt and by
several additional characteristics of the trade:
Vt = Vt-1>?2@:?At-1 + ?=8B22t + ?C=$7D t + t .
The variable CROSS indicates whether the trade was a so-called cross trade, that is, a
trade between the own accounting book of a dealer and its client. Such trades naturally26
are not originated in the SPAD system, but they must be reported such that the market is
aware of the order flow. The rationale for including this variable into the model is that










since the market might view cross trades as transactions that will not affect the market
(then cross trades would have lower information value) or as an indication of stronger
order flow (then the information value would be higher). We have also identified the
most active market makers and created the variable ACTIVE. This variable equals 1 if
the trade was initiated by one of the most active market makers–that is, if the trade is a
buy, one of the most active market makers was on the buy side of the trade and vice
versa. We consider the top five market makers in terms of trading volume to be the most
active. They account for almost 50% of trading volume. We include this variable because
a trade initiated by the most active market makers might have a higher information value
for other market participants. We assume that the error term  has zero mean conditional
on the right hand side variables.
The actual quotes that we observe are affected by inventory effects, however, as
discussed above, we assume that inventory matters only when there is significant buying
or selling pressure.
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Taking first differences and substituting for Vt yields
                                                     
17 The treatment of the inventory component is the main difference of our model from that of Huang and
Stoll (1997). It is important, since it allows us to use a rather simple estimation technique. Our estimation27
Et,?2@:?At-1>?2@:?At-1*PRESS t-1 + ?=8B22t + ?C=$7D t + t.   (5)







estimate the two equations simultaneously by the SUR routine in the TSP 4.4 package.
We also test for both autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.
4.2. Huang and Stoll (1997) Model
For the sake of comparison, we also estimate one of the two models of a three-way
decomposition of the spread presented in Huang and Stoll (1997). Our model presented
above is based on the general Huang and Stoll model, and we retain most of the notation
to save space and lower confusion. Huang and Stoll (1997) base their model on three
equations. First, the unobservable fundamental value of the stock Vt develops according
to
Vt = Vt-1>?2@:?At-1 + t .   (6)
Second, they assume that every trade affects the inventory position of the market marker
(they use NYSE data, so they apparently have the specialist in mind) and thus the
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Third, they assume the spread to be constant, with the random factor in the following
equation reflecting the deviation of the observed spread from its constant value:
                                                                                                                                                             
results and their comparison with the results of the Huang and Stoll (1997) approach, which are both
presented below, appear to support our method.28
Pt – Mt = S/2*Qt + t    (8)
Combining equations (6), (7) and (8) and taking first differences yields the basic
regression model







the model is estimated. This is the first model of Huang and Stoll (1997) that we estimate
on our data.
Then, Huang and Stoll offer two ways of fully decomposing the spread, i.e., two ways to
separate the inventory and adverse selection components. First, they use the serial
correlation in trade flows. Second, they use the concept of portfolio trading pressure that
we discussed above and that is similar to our approach. Since the concept of portfolio
trading pressure as described by Huang and Stoll is disputable, especially as far as the
specialist trading model is concerned, we have chosen to estimate the first model, which
is based on the serial correlation of trade flows.
This way of differentiating between the adverse selection and inventory components is
based on the observation that, given past order flow, the market forms an expectation
about the next order that is to come to the market. The conditional expectation of the
trade indicator at time t-1 given Qt-2 is












trade will be opposite. If we assume that the market knows equation (10), it will take this
expectation into account and the development of the fundamental value will be driven by29
Vt,?2@:?At-1 .?2@:?).:At-2 > t .   (11)
Combining this with equation (7), which describes the impact of inventory on the
position of the mid-quote, yields
Et,>?2@:?At-1 .?2@:?).:At-2 > t .   (12)
Furthermore, adding the constant spread assumption yields the final expression
3t = S/2*Qt>>.)?2@:?At-1 .?2@:?).:At-2 + e t    (13)



















simultaneously, again, using the SUR routine of the TSP 4.4 package.
5.  Size of Adverse Selection Component–Results of Estimation
5.1. The Adverse Selection Component of the Bid-Ask Spread–Our Model
We report the results for the middle choice of the variable PRESS, that is, the case in
which we require the cumulative trade indicator to exceed a value of 6, in Table 4. The
estimates for the other two choices of the PRESS variable were not substantially different
(except for the coefficient at the inventory variable itself). A full set of results can be
found in the Appendix. We present estimates for the two-month period–for September
and October 1999, since here we have the advantage of being able to use the ACTIVE30
variable for those trades initiated by the most active dealers. We have also estimated the
model for a four month period–August through November 1999–without this variable
and the results were not significantly different.
The adverse selection component, which is the primary focus of this paper, ranges from
8% in the case of Unipetrol to 30% for IPS. It is not surprising that the highest share of
adverse selection is found for the stock (IPS) that has the highest, almost 50%,
probability of informed trading. The most frequently traded stock, SPT Telecom,
exhibited a 12% share of adverse selection component in the spread. It might be
surprising, but, on average, the size of the adverse selection component is relatively low,
at 14%. In all eight cases (with the exception of RIF), the adverse selection component
was significant at the 5% significance level.




















































































































Note: PRESS 6 denotes the case when we require the cumulative trade indicator to exceed 6 for the selling
pressure to exist. The results for other definitions of the PRESS variable can be found in the Appendix. 
a
Stands for rejection of the null hypothesis (that the coefficient equals zero) at the 1% level of significance,
while 
b and 
c denote rejection at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. In the case of RIF, we have
encountered problems with the convergence of estimates, the reason might be rather low number of












impact were justified. It increases from the least strict choice (which counts almost one
half of all trades as occurring under trading pressure) to the most strict choice (which
classifies only approximately 10% of trades in this way). Moreover, the statistical
significance increases in this direction as well. While some of the coefficients at the least
strict variables are not statistically significant, those at the most strict are mostly highly
significant. The adverse selection component is small, on average it amounted to only
5%. All these facts suggest that the inventory component is not very important in the
Czech market. The vast majority of the spread–on average some 80%–is thus formed by
the order processing component.
As for the other explanatory variables, it appears that in half of the cases (SPT Telecom,
 !banka and, to a limited extent, Unipetrol) it matters to the market that the
trade is initiated by an active market maker. Interestingly, these are the four stocks with
the highest turnover. The significant coefficients are positive, which implies that a trade
initiated by a major market maker is viewed to have higher information value than other
trades. The coefficient at the CROSS variable is significant only occasionally and it
therefore appears that the market does not attach much significance to the information
that a trade is of the cross type.
The traded spread is smaller than the posted spread, which is in line with the findings of
previous studies. The traded spread as a fraction of the quoted spread is rather uniform
across the stocks in our sample–in all cases (except for RIF) the traded spread fits into the
range of 70–80% of the quoted spread.32
5.2. Huang and Stoll (1997) Model
The results of estimating the Huang and Stoll (1997) models are depicted in the following
table. In the table, we have combined the estimate of  from equation 9 with the results of
from joint estimation of equations 10 and 13.













































































a Stands for rejection of the null hypothesis (that the coefficient equals zero) at the 1% level of
significance, while 
b and 
c denote rejection at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
While the estimates of the combined share of adverse selection and inventory
components appear to be reasonable and correspond to the estimates implied by our
model above (they average 0.22), the distinction between these two components







                                                     
18 In fact, Huang and Stoll (1997) also obtained negative estimates of . LQLWLDOO\￿ 7KH\ DUJXHG￿ WKHQ￿ WKDW LW
is due to large orders being executed as a series of small trades executed in a short time period. They thus
combined all sequential trades at the same price and quotes into one trade. We do not consider this to be a
problem here, especially since the trading frequency is considerably lower for our stocks.33
data points by extending the sample by another two months does not change the results to
any significant extent. Overall, we believe the estimates of 
&	

robust since it comes as a product of a simple and straightforward model, and view the
results as a confirmation of the fact that adverse selection is not a major component of the
spread–its combined share with the inventory component is not estimated to be very
large.
6.  Conclusion
Abundant literature links informed trading and the size of the bid-ask spread and some
papers express the concern that a large amount of informed trading might substantially
limit the liquidity of the market or even lead to the shutdown of the market. The current
literature is not settled on the issue of the relative importance of the three components–
adverse selection, inventory and order processing ones–of the bid ask spread. We provide
evidence on this issue, with a focus on the adverse selection component, from an
emerging market that has been known to be driven by insider, or at least informed,
trading. Our main objective is to examine the share of the adverse selection component
with the eventual aim to establish the upper limit of its real-world significance. Should
this share also be small on a market, where informed trading is substantially more
widespread than on developed markets, it would confirm that the adverse selection
component is relatively unimportant.
First we test whether the Czech equity market is indeed plagued by informed trading. It
turns out that the probability of informed trading is indeed considerably higher on the
Czech market as compared to the developed markets. Moreover, if an information event34
occurs, the arrival rate of informed traders is significantly larger than the underlying
arrival rate of uninformed traders, which further increases the risk market markers face.
They should thus be expected to require higher compensation for this risk and increase
the adverse selection component of the spread.
We then estimate the components of the bid-ask spread. We use recent findings of studies
that tested the inventory behavior of dealers in multiple dealer trading systems to modify
the general Huang and Stoll (1997) model. Earlier studies treated the systems of market
makers the same as single-dealer systems. However, there is a substantial difference
between the inventory impact in a single dealer (specialist) system and a multiple dealer
system. First, multiple dealers have a higher capital base and thus also higher risk-taking
capacity than a single dealer. Second, the positioning of quotes relative to other dealers
depends on the current inventory level, which means that many trades (even though not
initiated by the market maker) do not bring undesired inventory, but rather bring the
inventory to the desired level. Therefore, in our model, inventory impacts quotes only in
times of trading pressure. In fact, our results confirm that inventory is of rather low
importance even in times of trading pressure.
Our estimates of the bid-ask spread components suggest that the adverse selection
component amounts only to 14%, on average, which is rather low and comparable with
the recent estimates from developed markets. It appears that the relative importance of
the adverse selection component is low–even on a market, which is significantly driven
by informed trading. Our findings thus confirm that adverse selection is relatively
unimportant as a determinant of the bid-ask spread across markets.35
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Note: PRESS 4 and 8 denotes the cases, when we require the cumulative trade indicator to exceed 4 and 8,
respectively, for the selling pressure to exist. 
a Stands for rejection of the null hypothesis (that the
coefficient equals zero) at the 1% level of significance, while 
b and 
c denote rejection at the 5% and 10%
levels, respectively. In the case of RIF, we have encountered problems with the convergence of estimates,
the reason might be rather low number of observations; we obtained implausible estimates and do not
report them here.